Address:
Department of Economics
McGill University
Leacock Building
855 Sherbrooke St. West
Montréal, Québec
Canada H3A 2T7
Phone: 514-398-1226
Email: rui.castro@mcgill.ca
A small group of people accounts for most flows between labor market states and most spells in non-employment. Using NLSY79 panel data, we apply k-means clustering on labor force transitions between ages 30 and 50 to identify a weakly attached group, disproportionately female, less educated, and in poor health. Using only information from ages 22 to 29, we predict membership in this low-attachment group with high precision, especially from early labor market experiences and health, pointing to persistent heterogeneity that shapes labor market outcomes over the life cycle.
We build a tractable model of firm-pay heterogeneity, introducing monopsony power into a Hopenhayn-style firm dynamics framework. We use it to understand earnings inequality in Portugal, which rose from the mid-1980s but has fallen steeply since the mid-1990s. We trace this decline to a compression in firm pay, driven by a weaker pass-through from firm productivity to wages, suggesting falling employer labor market power as a chief determinant.
Labor force states and the flows between them are useful tools for modeling individual labor market dynamics. This chapter reviews recent literature uncovering substantial heterogeneity in these transitions, replicating leading studies with Canadian data and relating the findings to the literatures on recall non-employment, duration dependence, and job ladders.
We study how firm-level financial frictions affect aggregate productivity when credit constraints distort both production and schooling decisions. Anticipating future constraints, entrepreneurs under-invest in schooling, so frictions misallocate talent across occupations and capital across firms while also lowering firm productivities. These channels account for 36% to 68% of the U.S.-India productivity gap, with schooling distortions the major source.
We study educational attainment across the 1932-1972 cohorts using a calibrated model of human capital investment with heterogeneous learning ability, where schooling responds to skill prices, tuition, education quality, and cohort ability. A version with static expectations fits the main patterns: rising college skill prices explain the rapid rise in graduation through the 1948 cohort, while declining average ability helps explain its subsequent stagnation.
We estimate the volatility of plant-level idiosyncratic shocks in U.S. manufacturing, measured as the variation in Revenue TFP unexplained by industry, economy-wide, or establishment characteristics. Idiosyncratic shocks dominate, accounting for about 80% of the uncertainty plants face. Cross-sectoral variation is remarkable, roughly sixfold between the most and least volatile sectors, and idiosyncratic risk is higher where creative destruction is likely greater.
Which countries find it individually optimal to form an economic union? Emphasizing the risk-sharing benefits of integration, we study an endowment world economy with incomplete markets and unenforceable contracts, where a union resolves both frictions among members but still faces them externally. We derive conditions on members' initial income and net foreign assets under which a union is welfare-improving, predicting that unions are infrequent and most likely among homogeneous, rich countries.
We characterize asset returns in a general equilibrium production economy with Chew-Dekel risk preferences and convex capital adjustment costs. With disappointment aversion consistent with the experimental evidence, the model, calibrated to output and consumption growth volatility, generates expected returns and prices of risk in line with the data. By contrast, Epstein-Zin preferences require a risk aversion of at least 50, reflecting the limited risk a calibrated growth model imposes on agents.
Since joining the EU in 1986, Portugal has grown strongly, with output per worker rising 2.25% annually, a falling relative price of investment, higher investment fueled by capital inflows, and improved resource allocation evident in a declining firm-level dispersion of labor productivity and size. We argue that improvements in outside investor rights since EU accession are a prime candidate to explain these facts.
Poor countries invest less and face higher relative prices of investment goods, often attributed to investment distortions. We provide a micro-foundation: firms producing capital goods face higher idiosyncratic risk than those producing consumption goods, and with incomplete investor protection this risk drives a wedge between sectoral returns that widens as protection weakens. Countries with weaker institutions thus face higher investment prices, invest less, and end up poorer. We find this mechanism may be quantitatively important.
We document a dramatic change in the cyclical behavior of aggregate skilled hours since the mid-1980s: using CPS data for 1979-2003, the volatility of skilled hours relative to GDP has nearly tripled, while unskilled hours are essentially unchanged. A simple supply/demand model with capital-skill complementarity accounts for about sixty percent of this increase in the relative volatility of skilled labor.
How does openness affect economic development? I answer this in a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy where countries differ in technology, both in sector-neutral terms and specifically in the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark of trade in credit markets only, fully restricting trade lowers income dispersion only slightly with a small welfare loss, whereas full trade liberalization sharply reduces dispersion and yields very large welfare gains.
I investigate whether technological shocks calibrated to observed cross-country income dispersion can also account for development regularities in capital accumulation, using a quantitative model of an integrated world economy. The open economy framework disciplines country heterogeneity with international capital flows and enables study of distinctly open economy facts. Compared to Penn World Table data, the model generates too little dispersion in capital-output ratios and investment rates, but matches the relative importance of investment, saving, and capital flows for development.
Does investor protection foster growth? We introduce it into a standard OLG model of capital accumulation. Better protection improves risk-sharing and, given entrepreneurial risk-aversion, raises capital demand (the demand effect); but in general equilibrium it also raises interest rates and lowers entrepreneurs' income, reducing savings and future capital supply (the supply effect), which is stronger where capital flows are more restricted. The model thus predicts a stronger positive growth effect where capital flows are less restricted, a prediction supported by cross-country data and the experiences of South Korea and India.
We explain why efficient reforms may fail even when losers can block them and compensations are feasible. A government sequentially implements two reforms by bargaining with endogenously organized interest groups, where distortionary compensations are valued differently across governments. To discourage losers seeking only transfers from organizing, governments offer low compensations, but this lets groups with high losses block reform, biasing outcomes against both compensation and reform.